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Transparency, accountability and empowerment in sustainability 




This paper offers a conceptual examination of the power-effects of transparency, as 
information disclosure, on those making accountability claims against actors deemed to be 
causing significant environmental harm. Informed by Lukes’s (2005) multi-dimensional 
theory of power, I review recent scholarship to interrogate four hypotheses positing 
empowerment for accountability claimants arising from the disclosure of sustainability 
information. Across public and private governance forms, academic research suggests that 
information disclosure promotes the communication of the sustainability interests of affected 
parties, and in some cases enhances the capacity of these parties to evaluate justifications 
provided by relevant power-wielders. However, evidence is weaker that disclosure of 
sustainability information empowers accountability claimants to sanction or otherwise steer 
those responsible; and there is little support that transparency fosters wider political 
interrogation of the configurations of authority producing environmental harm. 
Differentiating between behavioural and non-behavioural understandings of power allows an 
evaluation of these research findings on the power-related effects of information disclosure. 






In what ways does transparency, understood here as information disclosure, empower those 
seeking accountability for actions causing significant environmental harm? It has become a 
maxim of “governance by disclosure” (Gupta, 2008: Haufler, 2010; Stephan, 2002) that 
transparency facilitates empowerment, as applied to multiple scales and issues of 
sustainability governance. Viewing transparency as a necessary condition of accountability 
carries transformative assumptions; that those negatively affected have the capability to make 
a meaningful political claim for answerability and redress. Whether these claims are relayed 
directly to those held responsible or communicated to a governing authority, the expectation 
is that information disclosure assists in the political mobilisation of affected parties, leaving 
scholarship to examine the institutional practices impeding or promoting accountability in 
relevant issue areas. However, largely unexamined are the different ways in which the power-
effects attributed to the disclosure of sustainability information connect to accountability 
claim-making. 
This paper offers a conceptual examination of the power-effects of information disclosure for 
those engaged in accountability claims against actors deemed to be causing significant 
environmental harm. In what ways, and to what extent, do different practices of disclosure 
displace, replace or replicate power differentials in relationships of accountability? The 
theoretical point of departure is Steven Lukes’s (2005) multi-dimensional view of power as a 
capacity to secure a state of affairs, which encompasses both influence over (non)decision-
making and a less overt, systemic capacity to produce outcomes favourable to the powerful 
without the need for coercive interventions (2005, p.28). This conceptual framing accounts 
for situations in which particular vectors of empowerment in a governance domain may in 
fact co-exist with disempowering effects on a wider transformative politics. While the paper 
reviews a range of empirical studies investigating the nexus of transparency, accountability 
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and (environmental) sustainability, its principal aim is to offer an analytical understanding of 
how transparency relates to accountability claim-making in sustainability governance. 
I next provide a brief summary of the main conceptual perspectives on transparency-led 
accountability in sustainability governance, identifying from this literature four hypotheses 
positing different power-effects for accountability claimants arising from the disclosure of 
sustainability information: these hypotheses are differentiated below according to behavioural 
and non-behavioural understandings of power, as categorised by Lukes. This conceptual 
discussion is followed by a review of recent scholarship (drawing on a bibliographic search 
of academic publications since 2001) concerned with the functioning of information 
disclosure in sustainability governance, differentiated according to whether public or private 
actors are the principal loci of governing authority. The conclusion summarises findings on 
the four hypotheses as they relate to a multi-dimensional theory of power. 
 
Information disclosure and empowerment in sustainability governance 
Disclosure-led claims for accountability are one subset of what has been labelled a 
transparency turn in sustainability governance, encompassing diverse trajectories of 
information flowing from and to a wide range of state and non-state actors (Gupta & Mason, 
2014; Kraft et al., 2011; Mol, 2007). The connections between transparency and 
accountability are complex in this governance domain (Biermann, 2014, p.123; Kramarz and 
Park, 2016): if we accept a broad definition of sustainability as involving responsibility for 
actions affecting future people (Norton, 2005, p.304), the sustainability goals which may be 
addressed by disclosure-led accountability are multiple – inter alia economic efficiency, 
environmental effectiveness, social equity, and resilience – and may or may not be internally 
coherent depending on particular applications. Despite this value multiplicity, since the 1990s 
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there has been a growing uptake of information disclosure as a regulatory choice for 
furthering sustainability, evident in such widely shared disclosure methods as environmental 
assessment, pollution and transfer registers, public accessibility of governance meetings, 
sustainability ratings schemes and social-ecological certification. 
Transparency of governance processes is often assumed to be a necessary if not sufficient 
condition of accountability where accountability is broadly understood as holding 
authoritative actors both answerable for their actions and also subject to evaluation and 
redress by those affected by them (Bäckstrand, 2008; Florini, 2007; Grant & Keohane, 2005). 
Table 1 lists four hypotheses of empowerment to categorise posited effects of information 
disclosure on accountability claimants. These hypotheses identify different causal 
mechanisms of empowerment of accountability claimants arising directly from the disclosure 
of sustainability information. As noted below, the hypotheses are derived from theoretical 
accounts of the transparency-accountability nexus in sustainability governance: they are open 
to rejection to the extent that empirical findings may, in relation to the counterfactual, 
demonstrate a reduction in power (disempowerment) or no change (i.e. a failure to empower 
or disempower). The hypotheses also reflect Lukes’s (2005) multi-dimensional concept of 
power, which distinguishes, on the one hand, between power as the capacity of actors to exert 
control or influence over political-policy decisions (one-dimensional view) and nondecisions 
(two-dimensional view) and, on the other hand, the capacity to secure domination (third-
dimensional view); that is, the ability “to prevent people, to whatever degree, from having 
grievances by shaping their perceptions, cognitions and preferences in such a way that they 





H1 Reducing information asymmetry between a decision maker and affected parties 
lowers the information costs of the latter making accountability claims 
H2 Information disclosure enhances the capacity of accountability claimants to evaluate 
justifications provided by the relevant power-wielder 
H3 Information disclosure enhances the capacity of accountability claimants to steer 
relevant power-wielders 
H4 Information disclosure empowers accountability claimants by fostering political 
interrogation of the configurations of decision-making authority producing 
environmental harm 
 
Table 1: Hypotheses positing empowerment of accountability claimants arising directly from 
the disclosure of sustainability information 
The first two hypotheses on empowerment capture the causal claim that disclosure of 
sustainability information fosters answerability by empowering the capacity of affected 
parties to represent their interests and to assess justifications provided by decision makers 
held responsible. Thus, Hypothesis 1 (H1) states that reducing information asymmetry 
between a decision maker and affected party lowers the information costs of the latter in 
making their accountability claims, while Hypothesis 2 (H2) states that information 
disclosure enhances the capacity of accountability claimants to evaluate justifications 
provided by the relevant power-wielders. Claim-making for answerability is a relational 
exercise in which transparency only becomes relevant insofar as affected parties use the 
disclosed information to construct shared sustainability interests and compel wielders of 
power to justify their decisions. Linguistically, accountability is an illocutionary effect: an 
actor gives an account of her or his actions according to reasons that may be accepted as 
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convincing by those affected (Habermas 1998:310). Whether the justification provided by the 
power-wielder is accepted as plausible by the affected parties depends on their evaluative 
capacity as well as the information released, and reasons given, by the responsible party. This 
is not a static relationship as it is constituted, in principle, by intersubjective, iterative 
dialogue on accountability open to revision in the light of new evidence and possible mutual 
understanding.  
Over and above answerability for governance decisions with significant sustainability effects, 
holding to account also implies an ability to change the behaviour of the governance actor 
responsible for the relevant decision(s), whether in relation to standards set by an existing 
institutional context and/or other societal norms. Environmental sustainability, as a normative 
notion, prioritises accountability standards informed by the need to prevent and/or mitigate 
significant socio-ecological harm. The more the impacts of governance decisions are shown 
to approach or cross biophysical thresholds, seriously degrading human conditions of life 
(Rockström et al., 2009; Steffen et al., 2015), the greater the moral legitimacy claimed for 
sustainability against competing norms and values. Of course, complexity and uncertainty, 
along with the growing hybridity of governance arrangements, often create major scientific 
challenges in ascribing responsibility for particular environmental effects. However, in a 
specific governance context, where accountability claimants credibly reveal involuntary harm 
caused by the decisions of a public or private actor, we can ask to what extent disclosed 
information fosters greater compliance of these power wielders, whether through their 
exposure to sanctions or from an enhanced capacity of affected parties to monitor and call 
them to account. The aspect of empowerment posited here is expressed by Hypothesis 3 (H3) 
– information disclosure enhances the capacity of accountability claimants to steer relevant 
power-wielders. Empirically this requires evaluating the role of disclosure-led accountability 
claims in altering the behaviour of responsible parties. Moving beyond accountability claim-
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making for particular sustainability-related grievances, Hypothesis 4 (H4) posits the 
disclosure-led empowerment of accountability claimants by fostering in them a political 
interrogation of the configurations of decision-making authority producing environmental 
harm. The power-effects here relate to influence over the design of disclosure-based 
governance and institutional choices over sustainability.  
Scholarly accounts of the transparency-accountability nexus in sustainability governance 
engage at least implicitly, if selectively, with the hypotheses identified above, and are 
informed by different theoretical frameworks. The multi-dimensional theory of power 
developed by Lukes allows us to identify which aspects of power are addressed by this 
literature, distinguishing broadly between behavioural and non-behavioural views of power. 
Behavioural accounts focus on those aspects of power in decision-making that are accessible 
to empirical observation, as expressed by the political preferences and participation of 
individual actors: the locus of one-dimensional power, Lukes claims, is therefore the capacity 
of an actor to enact decisions (2005, pp.16-19). Two-dimensional power also relates to the 
preferences and capacities of individual actors, but names a separate nondecision-making 
power to prevent grievances being articulated politically or decisions being taken (Lukes, 
2005, pp.20-25). 
Principal agent and institutionalist perspectives on disclosure-based accountability claims 
within sustainability governance tend to focus on the exercise of one- and two-dimensional 
power, exploring the effects of information asymmetries as they impact on actor behaviour 
and decision-making. Reducing such asymmetries through information disclosure increases 
the communicative resources for affected parties to make answerability claims against a 
power-wielder (H1) and test their justifications (H2), making it more difficult for those held 
responsible to manipulate information purely for strategic self-interest (H3). Informed by 
information economics and rational choice analysis, principal-agent theory thus considers 
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strategic interactions between parties subject to an accountability relationship in which the 
agent is answerable to, and sanctionable by, at least one principal. As Rosenberg (2017, p.14) 
argues, different patterns of accountability apply depending on the mix of public and private 
authority, but there is a shared propensity for agents to hide information in order to protect 
their interests. For example, research on greenwashing by firms has revealed that under 
governmental threats of mandatory disclosure, corporations selectively disclose positive 
sustainability information, misleading consumers who make green purchasing choices (Lyon 
& Maxwell, 2011; Lyon & Montgomery, 2015). In global sustainability governance, where 
accountability relationships stretch across overlapping institutions and international borders, 
the provision of sustainability information can also be skewed by principal-agent dynamics 
(Andonova, 2010; Rosenberg, 2017). From this theoretical stance increased transparency in 
governance can improve accountability for relevant sustainability impacts by reducing the 
capacity of the agent to produce selective, potentially misleading, information. 
Rational choice analysis also gives rise to institutionalist perspectives on transparency-
accountability relationships in public and private governance for sustainability. These 
approaches consider power as a capacity of individual actors to achieve intended outcomes, 
as gauged from observed interactions and behavioural changes. Rational choice 
institutionalism treats institutions as rule-governed settings in which institutionalised 
disclosure can overcome barriers to cooperation amongst self-interested actors arising from 
the presence of uncertainty and economic disincentives to contribute to public 
(environmental) goods. Structured disclosure of data on environmental impacts allows in 
principle the identification and sanctioning of free-riding polluters, whether applied to 
corporations (Garcia et al., 2009; Bae et al., 2010) or states (Barrett, 2003, pp.269-91; Bosetti 
et al., 2013). Here the “power” of additional information for actors is an enhanced capacity to 
build trust through communication, reducing incentives not to cooperate. Broadly sharing the 
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behaviourist assumptions of rational choice theory but drawing also on organisational theory, 
liberal institutionalism has, in its investigation of the transparency-accountability nexus in 
sustainability governance, moved beyond an early focus on environmental disclosure 
mechanisms enabled by public international law (e.g. treaty obligations between states to 
notify, consult and seek consent) to capture the complex dynamics of information disclosure 
associated with private and hybrid forms of governance at different scales (Bauhr & 
Nasiritousi, 2012; Huang & Yue, 2017; Pattberg, 2017). However, the analytical interest 
remains how the targeted disclosure of information can, through improved opportunities to 
evaluate and steer behaviour, facilitate more effective sustainability governance. Liberal 
institutionalism relaxes the strong utilitarian premises of rational choice theory when 
examining real-world contexts of sustainability governance by disclosure, paying greater 
methodological attention to decision settings and the two-dimensional power effects of 
agenda-setting and control. 
Lukes’ third-dimensional view of power overcomes what he claims are the limitations of a 
behavioural approach which, focused methodologically on the preferences of actors, sees 
power operate through decisions and observable conflicts. While observable behaviour may 
provide evidence for attributing the exercise of power – including for assessing the validity of 
Hypotheses 1-3 – for Lukes the third dimension of power illuminates a systemic capacity to 
advance certain interests, whether through the operation of social processes and institutional 
practices, or indeed individuals’ decisions (2005, pp.25-29). Third-dimensional 
empowerment of accountability claimants, from the disclosure of sustainability information, 
is captured by Hypothesis 4: information disclosure is posited to empower these actors by 
fostering political interrogation of the configurations of decision-making authority producing 
environmental harm. Critical political economy and constructivism are leading theoretical 
approaches investigating third-dimensional power in sustainability governance. Their 
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coverage of (dis)empowerment dwells on the embedding of disclosed information in material 
and linguistic contexts of power.  
For critical political economy perspectives, power is grounded in the social structures and 
unequal relations of the global political economy (Newell, 2008). This situates sustainability 
governance in relation to economic globalisation and its systemic production of 
environmental harm, examining the growing spread of private authority, capitalist constraints 
on international regulation, and the political challenges raised by non-state actors. It opens 
analytical space for less observable aspects of power; notably, the political-economic forces 
and institutional biases that determine whether and how environmental sustainability issues 
are addressed (Newell, 2008, pp.523-24). The presence of such agenda controlling power 
within the transparency-accountability nexus for sustainability governance means 
acknowledging conditions under which information disclosure may, by its selectivity and 
framing, displace or dilute efforts to exercise politically meaningful accountability claims 
against those responsible for harmful practices. Examples include accountability disputes 
over the voluntary corporate reporting of sustainability information within the Global 
Reporting Initiative and Carbon Disclosure Project (Knox-Hayes & Levy, 2014) and by the 
agricultural biotechnology industry (Clapp, 2008). 
As argued by constructivist perspectives, the very processes of political contestation and 
negotiation over the nature of information – what is valid knowledge and who has epistemic 
authority – are constitutive of sustainability governance (Fischer, 2009, pp.168-88; Gupta et 
al., 2014). This insight focuses on the discursive power of transparency, including the 
conditions of possibility of disclosure-based empowerment through constituting, using and 
debating transparency (Vijge, 2018). Thus, the power effects of transparency turn less on 
reducing information asymmetries in order to produce more rational outcomes, than on 
whose information counts and is accorded primacy in collective choices (Gupta & Mason, 
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2014:10; Mason, 2008). Kramarz and Park (2016) press this constructivist argument further: 
transparency is pivotal to realising accountability in governance only insofar as it 
encompasses deliberative openness over, and interrogation of, the purposive choices made by 
authority holders in determining the design of governance processes; for these choices are 
constitutive of the full operating field of accountability – accountability for what, to whom 
and how. This involves, they claim, the necessary investigation of the biases of all wielders of 
governance authority, exposing how specific actors and interests are legitimated. 
Critical political economy perspectives and constructivist theory are sceptical of the 
empowerment posited by Hypothesis 4, viewing instead in third-dimensional power a 
propensity by power-wielders to foreclose framings of sustainability that demand strong 
accountability for the production of environmental harm. The power-effects identified here 
are systemic and institutional, suggesting that foreclosing arises less from strategic efforts at 
agenda control and more the reproduction, through information disclosure, of dominant 
technical-managerial norms of sustainability. This idea of foreclosing is consistent with 
critiques of the idea of sustainability as a technology of governance, reproducing consent on 
the idea of sustainability as carving out, and legitimating, a “safe operating space” 
(Rockström et al., 2009) for global capitalism. These critiques identify a widespread 
naturalistic self-understanding of sustainability that displaces politically and economically 
situated understandings of “environmental” problems (Latour, 2004, pp.18-32; Swyngedouw, 
2011). As Swyngedouw asserts, “there is nothing foundational in Nature that needs, demands, 
or requires sustaining” (2011, p.261). By its naturalistic generality, environmental 
sustainability is seen to mask the systemic concentrations of power that must be addressed to 
realise meaningful accountability for socio-ecological harm. 
In the next section of the paper, I review recent scholarship on the functioning of information 
disclosure in sustainability governance, seeking to identify salient empirical findings on 
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whether and how transparency furthers accountability, having regard to the hypotheses above 
on the empowerment of accountability claimants. While acknowledging the complexity and 
increasing hybridity of sustainability governance, the review distinguishes analytically 
between public and private sources of institutional authority. 
 
Public authority and sustainability disclosure 
As Kramarz and Park (2016, p.10) remark, public accountability is the default setting for 
discussions of responsibility and answerability for environmental harm because states remain 
the primary holders of governance authority. Principal-agent theory has been widely applied 
in political science to examine the public accountability of state institutions, probing the 
means by which bureaucracies are held to account by higher-order political and judicial 
actors, as well as the accountability of political representatives to their electorates. 
Nevertheless, prevailing patterns of interest representation in national regulatory systems do 
not readily register sustainability values, notably the consideration of transboundary 
environmental degradation, intra- and inter-generational justice, and the protection of 
common-pool resources. There is also a marked discrepancy between the proliferation of 
multilateral environmental agreements and assessments of environmental sustainability 
marking continuing deterioration in climatic, ecological and biogeochemical systems (e.g. 
Steffen et al., 2015). 
A key rationale, then, for the disclosure of sustainability-related information by public 
authority actors is to improve feedback on social and ecological effects, assuming that the 
reduction of information asymmetries between decision makers and affected parties allows a 
more effective communication of the sustainability concerns of the latter (H1) along with 
greater answerability (H2) and responsiveness (H3) from the former. However, research on 
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transparency in global environmental governance finds that reductions in information 
asymmetry on sustainability effects are, by themselves, not sufficient to secure greater 
external accountability in governance (Ciplet et al., 2018; Gupta & Mason, 2014), so there is 
a low evidential basis for confirming H1 and H2, which also makes problematic their causal 
link to disclosure-led steering (H3). Instead, research generally supports a finding in the 
transparency literature that the governance effects of disclosure on recipients and disclosers 
rely on the information resonating with their everyday decision making (Fung et al., 2007).  
Research corroborating this “embeddedness” thesis covers a wide range of national political 
systems. As Florini and Jairaj (2014) observe in their cross-national survey of environmental 
transparency mechanisms, variations in capacity to comprehend and act on disclosed 
information are significant determinants of the procedural empowerment of information 
users. Even in advanced democratic states with mature civil societies and established 
freedom-of-information laws, how information is processed and presented for public use 
shapes its utility for accountability claim-making; as shown, for example, in US studies on 
the Toxic Releases Inventory (Bae et al., 2010) and the mandatory reporting of carbon 
emissions (Matisoff, 2013). Where statehood and/or democracy is limited, disclosure-based 
environmental regulation is hampered without sufficient administrative and legal support for 
public information users, as shown by research on Indonesia (Blackman et al. 2004), the 
Philippines (Lee et al, 2013) and Myanmar (Vijge, 2018). Moves towards increased 
environmental transparency in China, under open government information regulations, have 
generated public accountability deficits arising from incomplete disclosure obligations – 
incentivising selective disclosure (greenwashing) from polluters (Huang & Chen, 2015) – and 
undeveloped infrastructures for the interpretation and use of information. Interestingly, some 
civil society organisations and local state actors in China have created, or supported, 
alternative data platforms – e.g. the Pollution Information Transparency Initiative – to boost 
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community representation of environmental interests and the answerability of polluters (Tian 
et al., 2016). 
For public authority exercised internationally, it is necessary to distinguish between state-led 
disclosure to other states and state-led disclosure to civil society actors, though both have 
public accountability implications. Prior informed consent mechanisms operate in several 
multilateral environmental agreements, including treaties on the transfer of hazardous waste 
(Basel Convention), hazardous chemicals and pesticides (Rotterdam Convention), persistent 
organic pollutants (Stockholm Convention), and trade in genetically modified organisms 
(Cartagena Protocol). While the formal disclosure obligations are between states, there is also 
an assumption that increased information about the risks of products registers the interests  of 
affected consumers (H1) and the answerability of producers (H2). Moreover, prior informed 
consent rules are seen as a vehicle of responsive sanctioning (H3) insofar as producers are 
encouraged to reduce the risk-bearing effects caused by their products: however, this steering 
effect is restricted by the selectivity of coverage of sustainability effects covered by prior 
informed consent rules, which are often skewed by the economic interests of powerful market 
actors (Gupta & Mason, 2014; Mitchell, 2011). 
As Mitchell (2011, p.1886) notes, market pressure on responsible producers from those made 
aware of harmful environmental effects is only one means of disclosure-led sanctioning (see 
also next section). Transparency enacted by holders of public authority can also be used to 
signal the illegitimate behaviour of public and private actors as a form of a “naming and 
shaming” with reference to violated environmental norms. In this respect, the measuring, 
reporting and verification (MRV) systems being developed in various environmental treaty 
regimes may over time facilitate greater answerability (H2) and responsiveness (H3) of 
power-wielders. Protracted negotiations within the UN climate change regime on MRV 
systems for reducing emissions from forest-related activities (REDD+), and nationally 
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determined contributions on emissions reductions under the 2015 Paris Agreement, attest in 
part to tensions between states over global public accountability for climate mitigation 
activities impinging on sovereign authority (Gupta et al., 2014; Winkler at al., 2017). 
The 1998 Aarhus Convention stands out as a seminal environmental treaty for endowing civil 
society actors with procedural rights central to accountability claim-making, including 
information access and meaningful opportunities to participate in, and challenge, 
environment-related decision-making. This remains an important multilateral instrument, 
notable for a novel compliance mechanism open to civil society submissions on the 
enactment of Aarhus obligations by contracting states. At the same time, the treaty only 
applies to information held by government bodies: private enterprises are excluded from 
mandatory disclosure obligation, although a 2003 Protocol of Pollution and Transfer 
Registers facilitates the standardised publication, by administrative authorities, of pollution 
emissions reported by the owners or operators of relevant facilities. Research on the 
implementation of Aarhus information disclosure provisions reveals a dilution of their legal 
force due to the significant discretionary space allowed to parties in interpreting treaty 
obligations (Mason, 2014). 
Sustainable development norms have entered the accountability metrics of international 
organisations, partly due to civil society advocacy. For example, Park (2010) shows how the 
interaction, over time, of World Bank actors and transnational environmentalist networks, 
created organisational recognition then endorsement in the Bank of norms of information 
disclosure and sustainable development. Bank dialogue with NGOs and the creation of an 
Inspection Panel to investigate breaches of social and environmental safeguards 
institutionalised a measure of external accountability: peoples facing actual or potential harm 
from a World Bank-funded project can request an investigation and justification for Bank 
actions (H2), with some evidence of project-specific and policy-level responses that have 
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altered World Bank practices (H3) (World Bank Inspection Panel, 2009, pp.79-92). An 
evaluation by Ehresman and Stevis (2014) of the disclosure policy and sustainability 
framework of the International Finance Corporation – the World Bank institution charged 
with assisting private investment in developing countries – identifies reduced asymmetries in 
information on significant social and ecological impacts between sponsored corporations and 
affected communities (H1) and generally a greater onus on the former to justify their projects 
(H2), but that, aside from certain projects applying to indigenous communities, there is no 
disclosure-responsive power for affected communities to steer or block a project (rejecting 
H3). 
Accountability relationships become even more complex as international organisations 
engage in hybrid governance relationships with private sector actors. Within global 
governance, there are numerous collaborative partnerships for sustainable development 
between state and nonstate actors, including sustainability-relevant partnerships under the 
Global Environment Facility, the United Nations Fund for International Partnerships and the 
voluntary Type-II Partnerships set in play by the 2002 Johannesburg Summit of Sustainable 
Development (Andonova, 2010; Bäckstrand, 2008; 2012). Heralding in principle “horizontal” 
governance forms for which transparency features as a major guarantor of internal (partner) 
and external (public) accountability, partnerships for sustainable development typically 
commit to the discursive justification of sustainability effects posited by H2, yet often fall 
short. Bäckstrand observes such failings in the Johannesburg Partnerships: “Deliberative 
processes tend to be cosmetic and symbolic and are often added-on or serve to legitimize 
decisions already made” (2012, p.174).  
Part of the accountability deficit arises, Bäckstrand claims, from the narrow governance role 
assumed by the Type-II Partnerships, focusing on rule implementation rather than rule-
making – a weakness compounded by a bias of representation and participation towards 
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global Northern states, large developing countries, climate capitalists, professional NGOs and 
multilateral bureaucracies (2012, p.175). She observes a governance domain in which 
deliberation of sustainability information forecloses political interrogation of private and 
public authority configurations producing environmental harm (rejecting H4). This mirrors 
the argument of Kramarz and Park (2016) that forms of accountability which fail to engage 
with the design of governance goals and institutional capacities displace a wider reckoning of 
the constitution and effects of authority. Thus, accountability gains in the World Bank Group 
relating to social and environmental safeguards are offset against a structural imperative to 
invest in or underwrite development projects advancing capitalist modernisation and 
industrialisation (Park, 2010, pp.242). Similarly, Bracking’s (2015) study of the Green 
Climate Fund – the principal UNFCCC funding mechanism for developing countries – 
reveals how powerful states and carbon trading interests captured its governance agenda, 
displacing and disregarding as “overflows” the demands of  civil society activists for greater 
external answerability (2015, pp.292-93). To be sure, the Green Climate Fund has a 
comprehensive information disclosure policy, which includes webcasting of Board meetings, 
though in practice such meetings are often closed off without public justification 
(Transparency International, 2017, p.20). 
 
Private authority and sustainability disclosure 
Over the past few decades, private authority holders and market-based transparency 
mechanisms have assumed a growing role in sustainability governance at multiple scales. 
Gupta and Mason (2016, p.83–84) identify marketisation and privatisation as major rationales 
driving the uptake of information disclosure in sustainability governance: the former refers to 
disclosure to facilitate the creation, functioning and expansion of markets for environmental 
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good and services, while the latter denotes (selective) disclosure to augment private value 
creation as it relates to sustainability opportunities and constraints. While both public and 
private actors may employ or face information disclosure norms to further market-based 
social choices, the privatisation rationale implies the fuller colonisation by private authority 
of governance relating to the disclosure and use of sustainability information. 
As noted above, principal-agent theory highlights incentives for selective disclosure by 
corporations to take advantage of asymmetric information over the sustainability effects of 
their products and production processes: this constitutes greenwashing insofar as the released 
information is misleading about wider sustainability losses (Huang & Chen, 2015; Lyon & 
Maxwell, 2011). H1 is affirmed, in contrast, insofar as enhanced disclosure improves market 
outcomes by boosting the scope and credibility of sustainability information transferred 
between relevant parties on external (third party) environmental costs. By signalling 
sustainability information as having economic value for a corporation, whether directly (e.g. 
demand for green products) or indirectly (e.g. reputational value, regulatory risks), disclosure 
assists consumers, shareholder and employees in holding producers to account for their 
market performance and social welfare impacts (Kramarz & Park, 2016, p.14). Outside these 
contractual relationships, civil society actors also use information disclosure to pressure and 
reward businesses on their performance in accord with sustainability standards. The 
campaigning of NGOs and activist coalitions continues to be important here, but there has 
also been a growing governance role for certification and labelling programmes jointly run by 
civil society and industry actors, where transparency is directed to the traceability of 
particular commodity chains: key examples include environmental stewardship schemes, 
extractive industries and agricultural commodity roundtables (Auld & Gulbrandsen, 2010; 
Schleifer, 2016; Vijge, 2018). 
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The direct commensurability of economic values suggests a tangible measure in private 
authority-led governance of the power effects of sustainability disclosure, for sustainability 
values are expressed by market metrics such as relative pricing, investment flows and market 
share. To take a leading example, the institutional members of the Carbon Disclosure Project 
(CDP) hold over $100 trillion in assets, making use of climate and environment data self-
reported by thousands of companies in an annual questionnaire. CDP has significantly 
improved the ability of institutional investors to assess climate-related risks and increased the 
availability of information on the sustainability-related activities of individual companies, 
whose questionnaire responses are posted on the CDP website. However, there is, at best, a 
qualified acceptance of H1 and reasons to question disclosure-led accountability gains in 
public answerability (H2) and responsiveness (H3) for climate change harm. Using CDP data 
to interrogate corporations is hindered by data comparability issues and, for civil society 
groups, a paywall behind which only corporate members have access to analytical software. 
There is also no evidence that the CDP has significantly affected plant-level carbon emissions 
or emissions intensity (Knox-Hayes & Levy, 2014; Matisoff, 2013). 
The commodification of climate transparency in the CDP mirrors the marketisation of 
greenhouse gas emissions information in carbon offset markets. Worth €48.4 billion in 
overall turnover in 2015 (Thomson Reuters, 2016, p.3), global carbon markets feature a wide 
variety of state-regulated emissions trading schemes within and outside the UN climate 
regime, alongside smaller markets in voluntary carbon offsets. Both the compliance and 
voluntary carbon markets reduce information deficits on climate liabilities for private actors, 
which may allow public discussions on climate risk – indirectly affirming H1. However, 
there are recurring problems over the credibility of these markets, largely due to their opacity 
and the growing privatisation of climate risk information. Even the UNFCCC emissions 
trading regime, with centralised accounting and verification oversight, has been compelled to 
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enhance transparency of certified emissions reductions to address concerns over their 
economic integrity. In the voluntary carbon markets, the majority of transacted offsets are 
verified by independent third-party standards (Ecosystem Marketplace, 2016, p.3), but this 
has not prevented fraudulent manipulation of climate information. While they are not 
designed to deliver deliberative justifications from actors responsible for major carbon 
emissions (precluding any testing of H2), carbon markets can in principle serve a steering 
role by building financial accountability for climate change risk (H3): this remains largely 
unrealised when the level and uptake of carbon prices remain low. 
There are impediments to public accountability claim-making in other major cases of 
disclosure-led governance focused on the sustainability performance of private actors. For 
example, the Global Reporting Initiative (GRI), a Dutch-based NGO, has developed the most 
widely used set of reporting guidelines for corporate sustainability, especially in the financial 
services and energy sectors. Not unlike the disclosure dynamics of the CDP, the analytical 
use of GRI information – with 34,000 open source sustainability reports available by 2016 
(Global Reporting Initiative, 2016, p.25) – by accountancy firms and other commercial 
intermediaries has skewed GRI-related discourses of sustainability responsibility towards 
corporate managerial goals (Caron & Turcotte, 2009). Civil society groups targeting specific 
sustainability losses have been frustrated by the lack of comparability and credibility of the 
self-reporting by companies (Dingwerth & Eichinger, 2014; Knox Hayes & Levy, 2014), 
which GRI has attempted to address with new global standards on sustainability (Global 
Reporting Initiative, 2016, pp.14-15). 
With their product-specific terms of reference and stakeholder governance structures, 
environmental stewardship schemes arguably provide more meaningful procedures for the 
deliberative justification of sustainability claims by corporate members (Kramarz & Park, 
2016, p.4). Evidence supportive of H2 is available from the use of transparency in both the 
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rule-making and auditing processes of the Forest Stewardship Council and Marine 
Stewardship Council, revealing a diverse range of nonstate actors discussing standards of 
environmental sustainability (Auld & Gulbrandsen, 2014; Gulbrandsen & Auld, 2016); and 
multi-stakeholder discourse on sustainability certification is also apparent in agricultural 
commodity roundtables, such as the Roundtable of Responsible Soy and the Roundtable on 
Sustainable Palm Oil (Schleifer, 2016). Gulbrandsen & Auld (2016) caution, though, that 
nonstate certification schemes can face normative tensions between internal (organisational) 
accountability and external accountability to those affected by these programmes: in the case 
of the Marine Stewardship Council, they identify a growing deficit in external accountability 
gauged by environmental NGOs leaving the scheme. Within nonstate certification 
programmes responsive sanctioning (H3) for breaches of performance standards operates 
internally according to mutually agreed rules on verification and enforcement. While it is not 
uncommon for product certificates to be refused or withdrawn, many NGOs and activist 
coalitions charge that the pressure to increase corporate uptake of these programmes has 
diluted their sustainability standards. 
At the same time, private governance schemes for sustainability certification do not wholly 
foreclose interrogation of relevant systems of political-economic authority (H4). Auld et al. 
(2015) observe a logic of empowerment informing these programmes – “an explicit aim to 
redistribute power, control, and resources to marginalized actors in global supply chains” 
(p.111). To be sure, empowerment here means economic actors favoured by sustainability 
certification through, for example, marketing access and training programmes, and such 
programmes can act as barriers to entry for smaller producers These power distributive 
effects serve external (public) accountability norms only indirectly to the extent that they 
converge with third-party interests in preventing sustainability losses; and this overlap 
depends on their sectoral and geographical coverage. At least for agricultural commodity 
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roundtables, evolving global supply chains and the growth of South-South trade have 
demonstrated how capitalism can bypass such certification practices (Schleifer, 2016). 
Nevertheless, sustainability disclosure in private governance has, alongside civil society 
campaigning, fed into the global growth of “fair business” norms. And in the last decade this 
has seen several transparency standards legally imposed on businesses over supply chain 
social and ecological risks; for example, mandatory due diligence requirements in the 




The discussion above of institutional trajectories of sustainability disclosure featuring public 
and private authority is by no means exhaustive, but suggests provisional conclusions on the 
four hypotheses positing that information disclosure empowers affected parties making 
accountability claims against relevant decision-makers (Table 2). Accountability claim-
making is a dynamic, intersubjective chain of speech acts heavily conditioned by contexts of 
communication (e.g. the openness and inclusiveness of linguistic exchanges between 
decision-makers and affected publics). The theories reviewed above all have analytical value 
in revealing particular power-related effects of information disclosure, broadly corresponding 
to behavioural (principal agent theory, institutionalism) and non-behavioural (constructivism, 
critical political economy) understandings of power. 
H1 Outside deceptive disclosure (e.g. greenwashing), reducing information asymmetry 
between a decision maker and affected parties tends to lower the information costs 
of the latter making accountability claims (general validity for H1) 
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H2 Information disclosure tends to enhance the capacity of accountability claimants to 
evaluate justifications provided by the relevant power-wielder, though this is less 
likely in contexts where sustainability information is marketised and/or privatised 
(partial validity for H2) 
H3 There is limited evidence that information disclosure enhances the capacity of 
accountability claimants to steer relevant power-wielders (H3 not supported) 
H4 There is limited evidence that disclosure of sustainability information fosters 
political interrogation of the configurations of decision-making authority producing 
environmental harm (H4 not supported) 
 
Table 2: Key findings on hypotheses positing empowerment of accountability claimants 
arising directly from the disclosure of sustainability information 
One- and two-dimensional power applies to vectors of empowerment where information 
disclosure causes behavioural change in the governance relations between power-wielders 
and affected parties, as related to coalescent layers of accountability – communication of the 
accountability claims of affected parties (H1), furthering thereby the answerability (H2) and 
responsiveness (H3) of decision makers. Principal agent and institutionalist research suggests 
that, outside greenwashing and other forms of deception, information asymmetry is likely to 
be reduced through environmental disclosure by decision makers, with evidence that the 
preferences (interests) of affected parties are more effectively registered (H1). There is some 
indication that public disclosure of sustainability effects increases the answerability of 
decision makers to affected parties (H2): this discursive empowerment can be observed in 
governance forms featuring both holders of public authority (e.g. international treaties with 
MRV systems, World Bank Group) and private authority (e.g. environmental stewardship 
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schemes), though where the release of sustainability information is significantly shaped by 
marketisation and privatisation logics (e.g. GRI, CDP), there is countervailing (two-
dimensional) nondecision-making over economic development pathways. 
While information released under sustainability disclosure schemes is often used by NGOs 
and other civil society actors to raise demands for answerability, there is limited evidence 
supporting H3 – that disclosure empowers accountability claimants by enhancing their 
capacity to steer relevant power-wielders. Responsive sanctioning by those subject to 
governance decisions tends not to be a formal feature of sustainability disclosure initiatives or 
is defined in narrow procedural terms (e.g. prior informed consent). For public sustainability 
governance, this reflects a preference for disclosure as an end in itself, detached from redress 
against holders of authority responsible for harm; and while sanctioning mechanisms do 
feature in some examples of private sustainability governance, these are more to do with 
protecting the club good benefits of participating members (e.g. environmental stewardship 
schemes, voluntary carbon disclosure) than strengthening environmental accountability to 
affected actors. 
Focusing on vectors of disclosure-led empowerment manifest in observable behaviour may 
miss third-dimensional power effects arising from taken-for-granted configurations of 
decision-making authority. The theoretical utility of critical political economy and 
constructivist approaches is in providing insights on this aspect of power as it relates to the 
disclosure of sustainability information. There is some evidence for this type of disclosure-
led empowerment (H4) where there are overlapping sustainability interests between affected 
parties and private governance initiatives, as noted by institutionalist research on 
environmental stewardship schemes (Auld et al., 2015). However, a recurrent finding of 
critical political economy and constructivist work is that disclosure of sustainability 
information often disempowers accountability claimants by foreclosing political interrogation 
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of the configurations of authority producing environmental harm. Sharing the critical intent 
informing Luke’s (2005) notion of three-dimensional power, the theoretical claim here invites 
political analysis on how sustainability information permeates, and reproduces, a dominant 
matrix of market liberal dispositions which frame environmental accountability as the domain 
of private choices and individual responsibility. Relevant research cited above featured cases 
in which sustainability disclosure diluted accountability on socio-ecological harm by 
displacing justice-oriented positions (e.g. UNFCCC Green Climate Fund), not challenging 
organisational imperatives inimical to sustainability (e.g. World Bank Group), and skewing 
discourses of sustainability reporting towards corporate managerialism (e.g. CDP, GRI). 
There are analytical challenges in justifying relevant counterfactuals for evaluating the third-
dimensional power to mislead, and identifying what Lukes calls the “real interests” of those 
dominated (2005, pp.148-50). These challenges are compounded for sustainability interests, 
where respect for global ecological limits calls for system-wide responsiveness exceeding the 
governance contribution of current mechanisms for disclosure-led environmental 
accountability. Moving beyond the focus in this paper on different vectors of disclosure-led 
empowerment, further research could investigate whether multiple, converging forms of 
transparency can build social learning on sustainability goals. Useful benchmarks here are 
ideas of meaningful discussion and political negotiation on environmental sustainability as 
determined by affected communities (cf. Norton, 2005, pp. 297-99).  
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